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The Farm Service Agency (FSA) guaranteed loan program is an increasingly important
source of funds for production agriculture.  FSA provides capital to borrowers who do not meet
commercial credit standards, but still possess the potential to establish financially viable farming
operations.  Until the mid-1980s, the majority of farm loan assistance that FSA provided were
direct loans funded entirely by congressional appropriations.  Over the last fifteen years, a definite
policy commitment has clearly been made at the federal level to shift lending from the public
sector to the private sector through the use of guaranteed loans.  The source of principal for
guaranteed loans comes from private lending institutions such as commercial banks or the Farm
Credit System, but FSA guarantees repayment of up to 95 percent of a loan made by a qualifying
lender if the borrower defaults.
Between fiscal 1986 and 1995, loan guarantees rose from 35.9 percent of total FSA
obligations to 77.5 percent of total FSA obligations (USDA/ERS, 1999).  This percentage has
recently decreased to 66 percent in fiscal 1998.  In fiscal 1986, $2.8 billion in direct loans and
$1.6 billion in guaranteed loans were obligated.  In contrast, $739 million in direct loans and $1.4
billion in guaranteed loans were obligated in fiscal 1998 (USDA/ERS, 1999).  FSA no longer
provides the higher volume of direct loans as in past years because Congress has not appropriated
the funds to do so.
Under the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, the obligation
levels for guaranteed loans are legislated to increase during the 1996 to 2000 time period.
Authorized guaranteed farm ownership (FO) loan obligation limits are scheduled to increase from
$600 million in 1996 to $750 million in 2000, while funding levels throughout the period are set at
a maximum of $85 million for direct FO loans and $500 million for direct operating (OL) loans2
(Koenig).  For guaranteed OL loans, authorized loan levels gradually rise from $1.9 billion to $2.1
billion (Koenig).  In addition, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1998 (Omnibus Act) increased the caps on borrower indebtedness for both
guaranteed FO and OL loan programs from $300,000 and $400,000, respectively, to $700,000
making the program more accessible to family sized farm operations (USDA/ERS,1999).  The
above factors combined with the gradual reduction of farmer deficiency payments under the FAIR
Act potentially place more demand on the FSA guaranteed loan program.
This study investigates the loss claims aspect of the FSA guaranteed loan program.  The
payment of a loss claim by FSA is the final step in settling a delinquent loan account with a
guaranteed lender.  Generally, some effort is made by FSA and the lender to help a delinquent
borrower resume payment on the loan by restructuring the terms or conditions of the loan.  When
such assistance is inadequate, the collateral is sold and the proceeds are disbursed to the lender.  If
the proceeds from the sale are not sufficient to cover the full amount of the principal due on the
loan, FSA pays the lender the guaranteed percentage of the lost principal.  This payment is termed
a loss claim.
Loss claim payments to guaranteed loans for the U.S. have fluctuated dramatically over
the last decade.  Guaranteed loss claims for the U.S. were at their lowest for the 1989-98 period
in fiscal 1995 at $32.3 million, while they reached a peak in 1997 at $57.8 million (table 1).  To
understand the full impact of the FSA guaranteed loan program and to make it more effective, it is
necessary to know which factors influence loss claims levels.  This study identifies farm operator,
farm economy, agricultural policy, guaranteed loan program and commercial bank variables most
important in explaining the variation in the payment of loss claims.  Factors such as debt-to-asset3
ratio, net farm income, farm size, government payments, interest rates, interest rate assistance,
and bank loan-to-asset ratio are among those variables hypothesized to be important.  This study
estimates how these factors influence the loss claims rates for both FO and OL loans.
DATA AND METHODS
This study estimates two regression models:  one for FO and one for OL loans.  For each
model the ratio of loss claims paid to principal outstanding is hypothesized to be a function of
several variables that measure:  (1) the financial well-being of farm operators, (2) the structure of
the agricultural industry, (3) the overall health of the agricultural sector and general policy toward
agriculture, (4) the level of activity in the various dimensions of the guaranteed loan program, and
(5) the agricultural lending policies of commercial banks.  These variables represent underlying
sources of financial risk either present at the time of loan origination or evolving from
circumstances arising during the life of loans that may result in loans becoming unsuccessful. 
Annual state-level, panel data for forty states from 1990–1997 constitute the estimation sample.
The data used in this study were obtained from several sources:  FSA offices in Kansas
City and Washington D.C., Economic Research Service, Bureau of the Census, Dun and
Bradstreet Corporation Business Failure Records,  Bureau of Labor Statistics, National
Agricultural Statistics Service and Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Report of Bank Condition
and Income Database.  Specific details are given in Fultz.   The dependent variable for the FO
model is the ratio of annual loss claims paid on guaranteed FO loans to beginning of the year1 Since several of the independent variables considered by the study are ratios, the dependent variables,
FO and OL loss claims paid, are normalized as proportions of principal outstanding.  The normalizations are
required because the sizes of the agricultural economies vary greatly across states. 
2 The variables DAR, NFI, ROA and DEBTSVC are computed using aggregate data from each state. 
DAR and ROA are both ratios, NFI is measured as dollars (in millions) divided by number of farm operations and
DEBTSVC is computed as the sum of interest and principal payments divided by gross cash farm income.
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principal outstanding (FONLC).
1  The dependent variable for the OL model, OLNLC, is
analogous to FONLC except it is defined for OL loss claims and principal outstanding.
Farm operator characteristics measure various aspects of the financial condition of farm
borrowers such as liquidity, solvency and profitability.  Variables such as debt-to-asset ratios, net
farm income, rates of return on assets, and liquidity measures have been used in prior studies such
as Turvey, Shepard and Collins, and Miller and LaDue to measure the financial risk of farm
operators.  The hypothesis in this study is that a strong financial position promotes timely
principal and interest payments of guaranteed loans.  Thus with strong financial variables (lower
debt-to-asset ratios (DAR), higher net farm income (NFI), higher rates of return on assets (ROA),
and lower debt servicing ratios (DEBTSVC)), fewer borrowers become delinquent and loss
claims payments decrease.
2   
Different agricultural enterprises face different risks.  A broad measure of enterprise
diversity is the percentage of agricultural revenues that come from crops as opposed to other
agricultural enterprises.  There appears to be a difference in the types of agriculture that use the
two types of guaranteed loans.  For fiscal 1988, Koenig and Sullivan estimate that only 30 percent
of those farm operators using OL loan guarantees had livestock (including dairy) as their major
farm enterprise.  For FO loans, 54 percent of the operators had livestock (including dairy) as their
major farm enterprise.  Dixon, Ahrendsen and McCollum find that as the proportion of revenues3 Measured in thousands of acres.
4 ERS <http://www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/fbe/hhold/hh_t0203.htm> accessed 3/16/99.
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coming from crops increases, the more likely banks are to make OL loans and the less likely they
are to make FO loans which is consistent with the evidence in Koenig and Sullivan for 1988.  The
variable CREV is defined as the proportion of agricultural gross revenue from crops.  If there is
greater concentration in one type of agricultural enterprise, then adversity in that enterpriseSsay
low crop pricesSis likely to lead to more loan defaults given the lack of diversity.  Thus we would
expect CREV to be positively related to OLNLC and negatively related to FONLC. 
The average size of U.S. farms
3 (SIZE) has increased over the past decade.  Shepard and
Collins hypothesized that an increase in farm size places greater emphasis on machinery, irrigation
equipment and other fixed inputs.  In addition, a capital intensive operation requires annual
purchases of insecticides, seeds, fertilizers, feeds or animals to complement the fixed inputs. 
Thus, an increase in SIZE may increase financial risk and increase loss claims rates. 
In order to reduce a portion of the financial risk associated with production agriculture, a
substantial number of farm operators are employed off the farm.  In 1994, the proportion of total
income for farm operator households derived from off-farm income was 90 percent.
4  The
importance of off-farm income to farm operators within a state is measured by the proportion of
farm operators working more than 200 days off the farm (WORK).  While off-farm income
provides a risk-reducing supplement to net farm income, a high proportion of farm operators
spending working days off the farm may indicate an absolute need for additional income to avoid
financial problems.5 LTINT and STINT are both nominal interest rates.
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Characteristics of the general economic environment reflect the overall condition and
health of the agricultural economy.  The ratio of total number of agricultural business failures in a
given state per year to the number of farm operations (FAIL) is one measure of the health of the
agricultural sector.  In addition, low state unemployment rates (UNEMP) are generally associated
with a healthy economy.  We hypothesize that a high number of failures or high unemployment
rates indicate financial stress for all areas of the industry, including farm businesses and will likely
lead to increases in guaranteed loss claims rates.  
As the interest rate charged on loans increases, borrowers may find qualifying for credit
given their existing repayment capacity more difficult because lenders are less willing to extend
credit.  Low interest rates allow farm operators to acquire credit to see them through the difficult
times, preventing or delaying failure (Shepard and Collins).  To account for this impact, the
interest rate charged by commercial banks on long term farm real estate loans (LTINT) is
included in the FO model, and the interest rate charged by commercial banks on short term non-
real estate farm loans (STINT) is included in the OL model.
5 
Farm policy such as annual direct government payments per farm operation (GOV) may
affect loss claims rates by supporting and stabilizing farmer income.  However, substantial
payments to farmers might also indicate financial stress (more government assistance needed to
shield farmers from the full financial effects of natural disasters or unfavorable market conditions). 
Thus, a directional relationship between farm policy and guaranteed loss rates cannot be
determined on a priori grounds.6 AVGFO and AVGOL are both measured in millions of dollars.
7 Unfortunately, principal outstanding is not the contingent liability for FSA.  An attempt was made to
obtain such data, but the record keeping system does not record such variables on a yearly basis by state.
8 An agricultural bank is defined as a bank having loans made for production agriculture and loans
secured by farm real estate that comprise at least 17 percent of total loans made (in dollar volume) in a given fiscal
year.
7
Dollar volume of principal outstanding per outstanding guaranteed FO and OL loan
6
(AVGFO and AVGOL) is a good measure of the current level of exposure FSA has to possible
 loss claims on a per loan basis.
7  The amount of interest rate assistance (IRA) paid per guaranteed
FO and OL loan (FOIRA and OLIRA) measures the variation in loss claims due to subsidizing the
interest rates on guaranteed loans.  Interest rate assistance is thought to facilitate the payment of
loan principal by lowering the total interest cost of the loan, but higher amounts of assistance may
foreshadow larger loss claim payments since loans are being made to borrowers who merit
assistance. 
The commercial bank characteristics considered in this study measure the importance of
agriculture in bank loan portfolios and the propensity of banks to make agricultural loans. 
Variation in loss claims rates due to changes in lending behavior to the agricultural sector is
captured by the ratio of agricultural loans to total loans made by commercial banks in the state
(AGTL).  The number of agricultural banks per farm (AGBNK) measures the availability of credit
from banks having a significant concentration of agricultural loans to farm operations located
within the state.
8  The ratio of total loans made by commercial banks in the state to total assets of
commercial banks in the state (LAR) measures lenders’ propensities to invest available funds in
loans as opposed to other investments.  9 Pacific, Mountain, Northern Plains, Southern Plains, Lake States, Corn Belt, Delta, Northeast,
Appalachia and Southeast. 
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Dixon, Ahrendsen and McCollum reported that agricultural banks are likely to make more
guaranteed loans than nonagricultural banks and found that increasing loan-to-asset ratios were
associated with greater bank participation in the guaranteed loan program.  This increased use of
guarantees was thought to shield lenders with aggressive lending policies from an otherwise
expanded exposure to agricultural loan losses.  That is, as banks seek to make more loans in a
given area, the base of customers left to extend credit to are marginally less credit worthy.
Since an increase in any of the commercial bank variables is hypothesized to result in a
larger number of guaranteed loans made, they are posited to have positive relationships with loss
claims rates.  However, agricultural lenders may be more sensitive to the potential problems that
arise in production agriculture that adversely affect the financial performance of their farm
borrowers.  These lenders are more likely to make special repayment arrangements to help the
farmer through difficult times.  This would imply that increases in these variables would decrease
loss claims rates. 
Since the data are panel in nature, the regression equations used in this study are fixed
effects models.  This allows for the intercept to vary by cross-sectional group but holds the slope
coefficients constant.  In the present analysis, intercept variation is examined by both state and
USDA production region.
9 10 The years in this study are FSA fiscal years which end on September 30 of each year.
11 The eight states deleted from the sample were Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey and Rhode Island.
12 Independent variables not reported on a fiscal year basis include DAR, NFI, ROA, DEBTSVC, CREV,
SIZE, WORK, FAIL, UNEMP and GOV.
13 Parameter estimates of the two models with all sixteen variables included are presented in Fultz.
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The observations are annual from 1990 to 1997.
10  Eight of the 48 states in the sample
were eliminated due to their relatively low levels of guaranteed loan activity.
11  These eight states
averaged annual total guaranteed obligations during fiscal years 1989-98 of less than $3 million. 
The data consist of 320 observations over the eight years.  Some of the independent variables
included in the study are measured by calendar year, and the dependent variables are measured by
fiscal year.  Since the calendar year includes one quarter (the fourth) that is not included in the
current fiscal year, all calendar year variables are lagged one year in order to avoid having the
future explain the present.
12  All dollar figures used in the study were deflated using chain type
price indexes for gross domestic product reported in The Economic Report of the President with
1992 as the base year. 
Both the FO and OL models were first estimated with all sixteen independent variables in
addition to regional/state shifters.  To reduce the number of independent variables in the models,
all variables with a t-ratio less than one were deleted unless this resulted in deleting all variables in
one of the five general categories thought fundamental in explaining the variation in loss claims:
(1) financial, (2) structural, (3) economic and policy, (4) FSA loan and (5) commercial bank
variables.  When all variables in a given category had t-ratios less than one in absolute value, the
variable with the highest level of significance was retained in the model.
13  This “category” rule14 The final models were also calculated using OLS to derive first order correlation coefficient estimates. 
The estimate for the FO model was 0.02198.
15 The Harvey multiplicative heteroscedasticity model in LIMDEP (Greene) was used.
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was invoked to create a rigorous level of successive significance tests.  After re-estimation, 
variables with a p-value greater than 0.10 were deleted.  In this step, the “category” rule was
allowed to be broken.  The models were then re-estimated for a final time. 
Due to the large proportion of FO observations taking on a value of zero in the sample (35
percent), Tobit models were estimated.  Although initial OLS estimates indicated that including
regions as the fixed effects groupings was less desirable than state-level fixed effects, the
LIMDEP algorithm (Greene) would not converge with all 40 state binary variables included. 
Therefore, regional fixed effects were used instead.   Unfortunately, software to estimate the
presence of autocorrelation in a model most appropriately estimated by a Tobit estimator was not
available.  As an approximate test for the presence of autocorrelation, the full model was
estimated as a fixed effects model by OLS including all the hypothesized regressors.  The estimate
of the first order correlation coefficient, assuming it is the same for each state, gave a value of -
0.0531.  Because this magnitude is so slight, it was assumed in further estimation of the FO model
that the error terms were non-autocorrelated.
14  A multiplicative heteroscedastic Tobit model was
specified to provide asymptotically efficient coefficient and standard error estimates in the FO
model where the sources of heteroscedasticity were the regions.
15  Six of the nine regional
heteroscedasticity terms were significant at the 0.05 level for the final FO model. 
For the OL loans, a time series/cross section model was specified and estimated using
feasible generalized least squares.  A Tobit framework was not employed for the OL model16 As with the FO model, the final OL regression model was reestimated using OLS to derive a final
autocorrelation estimate.  The estimate was -0.017393.
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because relatively few of the observations for OLNLC were zeros (5 percent).  State binary
variables were included to represent fixed effects.  As with the FO model, a check was made for
the presence of autocorrelation.  The first order autocorrelation estimate from the OLS fixed
effects model for OL loans including all the hypothesized regressors was -0.0422 indicating that
the data were not characterized by autocorrelation.  Thus, in all subsequent OL models, the error
terms were assumed to be non-autocorrelated.
16  A likelihood ratio test for groupwise
homoscedasticity was rejected at the 0.05 level, so all subsequent OL models were estimated
assuming homoscedastic errors within a state but heteroscedastic errors across states. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The FO Model
The estimated coefficients of the ten continuous independent variables in the final FO
model are displayed in table 2.  Of the ten explanatory variables in the final FO model, six
variables were hypothesized to have specific signs.  Of those six variables, DAR, ROA and
LTINT have the coefficient signs expected and are significantly different from zero.  The sign on 
NFI is unexpectedly positive but is not significant at the 0.05 level.  SIZE was expected to be
positively related to FONLC, but its coefficient is negative and insignificant.  Of the four variables
in the FO model with no a priori signs, all are significant at the 0.05 level.
The positive sign on DAR indicates that as farmers in the state have a greater amount of
debt relative to assets, the ratio of FO loss claims to outstanding principal increases.  This is
expected because a decrease in solvency implies more financial risk.  The negative sign on ROA12
indicates that as farmers are more profitable, loss claim payments to FO loans as a proportion of
outstanding principal decrease.
The unexpected positive sign on CREV is perplexing assuming that FO loans are used
more by non-crop farmers than crop farmers as found by Koenig and Sullivan for 1988
guaranteed loan participants.  We argued earlier that a greater concentration of livestock
enterprises would lead to less diversity and therefore a higher default rate for FO loans.  The
positive sign on CREV may indicate that as a state has a higher proportion of crop revenues then
crop farmers using FO guarantees are forced into default when crop prices are low or there is
drought (assuming that most of the variability of CREV is due to diversity of enterprise and not
price or output fluctuations).  Since relatively few loans are defaulted in any year, a modest
increase in the absolute number of crop farmers defaulting on FO loans could explain the positive
sign on CREV.      
The negative coefficient on WORK indicates that as the proportion of farm operators
working off the farm more than 200 days per year increases, FO loss claims rates decrease.  This
might be explained by farm operators reducing financial risk by supplementing farm income with
off-farm sources of income.  The direct relationship between LTINT and the ratio of FO loss
claim payments to outstanding principal supports the hypothesis that as credit costs increase,
more farms are financially stressed.
All three commercial bank variables–agricultural-to-total loan ratio (AGTL), loan-to-asset
ratio (LAR) and availability of agricultural banks (AGBNK)–were all negatively and significantly
related to FO loss claims rates.  The significance of AGTL and AGBNK support the notion that
agricultural lenders may be more sensitive to farm economy fluctuations that may adversely affect13
their borrowers’ financial performances.  Such lenders are able to select borrowers and adjust loan
terms accordingly.  Thus, this increased sensitivity on the part of agriculturally oriented
commercial banks to agricultural borrowers results in a decrease in FO loss claims rates.  The
significance of AGTL and AGBNK also emphasizes the role played by lenders with agricultural
expertise.  As more agricultural banks get merged into larger banks and lose their agricultural
interest (Ahrendsen, Dixon and Lee), loss claims might increase, implying a higher cost to the
FSA guaranteed loan program.  
The sign and significance of LAR are intriguing.  Our data show that states with higher
loan-to-asset ratios tend to be states that are dominated by larger banks.  If larger banks are less
aggressive and more uncomfortable in making agricultural loans, then they may require a greater
proportion of those agricultural loans made be guaranteed, even though the loans may be of high
quality.  This would enable such banks to reduce their risk exposure because the guaranteed
portion of the loan carries an almost zero risk rating.  This decreases the overall risk rating of the
bank even though it has a high loan-to-asset ratio.  The results imply that such behavior by banks
would reduce FO loss claims rates.     
In order to compare the effects of these variables on FONLC without accounting for
differences in units among the variables, elasticities were computed.  The elasticities for all
continuous variables retained in the final FO model are listed in table 2.  The elasticities of these
variables computed at the sample means vary from -3.59 for LAR to 1.75 for LTINT.  Four of the
eight variables significant at the 0.05 level–ROA, CREV, AGTL and AGBNK–are in the inelastic
range.  However, the other four variables significant at the 0.05 level–DAR, WORK, LTINT and14
LAR–are elastic.  Thus proportionate variations in these variables have the greatest impact on the
variation of the ratio of loss claims paid to outstanding principal for FO loans.  
The elasticity of 1.74 for DAR indicates that loss claim payments are quite sensitive to
farm operators’ debt situations.  In the 1980's when many highly leveraged farmers experienced
financial difficulties, FSA’s volume of farm loan losses soared rising from $434 million in 1986 to
$1.2 billion in 1987 and $3.3 billion in 1989 (USDA/ERS,1998).  A farm crisis similar to the
1980's could stimulate high levels of guaranteed loss claims again in the future.  The variable
LTINT is important in explaining the payment of loss claims as well.  An increase in the cost of
credit to farm operators for farm real estate could result in a surge of FO loss claim activity. 
However, the elasticity for WORK implies that farm operators can partially insulate themselves
from potentially negative changes in the economy such as higher interest rates or decreases in
farm income by diversifying their income.  The large negative elasticity for LAR suggests that
aggressive lending policies of commercial banks can lead to decreases in loss claim rates as
lenders expand their loan portfolio and seek to limit their overall risk exposure by guaranteeing
agricultural loans.
The OL Model
The regression statistics for the six continuous explanatory variables retained in the final
OL model are presented in table 3.  Of the six explanatory variables in the OL model, four
variables were hypothesized to have specific signs.  Of those four variables, DEBTSVC has a
positive sign on its coefficient as expected and is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
The SIZE coefficient is also significant, but the sign is unexpectedly negative.  Both STINT and
AVGOL have unexpectedly negative signs as well but are only significant at the 0.065 and 0.07115
levels, respectively.  Of the two variables in the OL model with no a priori expected signs (LAR
and AGTL), both are statistically significant with negative signs.  
The positive sign on DEBTSVC indicates that as the proportion of annual gross farm
income needed to service debt payments increases, OL loss claims rates also increase.  This is
expected because liquid farm operators are able to meet principal and interest payments more
easily than less liquid operations.  As in the FO model where DAR is significant, farm financial
stress is important in the OL model when measured by DEBTSVC.
The negative sign on SIZE is unexpected since an increase in farm size is hypothesized to
result in increased financial risk.  However, larger farms may be more efficient in all aspects of
farming: production, marketing and financing.  Thus, increased farm size may result in less risk. 
This hypothesis is consistent with a negative relationship with loss claim rates.
   As with the FO model, the negative and significant signs on AGTL and LAR indicate that
agricultural lenders and lenders with aggressive lending policies decrease loss claim rates.  The
negative sign on AGTL implies that agricultural lenders are more sensitive to borrower repayment
capacities.  As noted earlier, LAR’s negative sign is surprising, but the fact that it is negative in
both models suggests that aggressive lenders could be using guaranteed loans more frequently
than other lenders to cover risks and therefore have lower loss rates.  This hypothesis is partially
supported by Dixon, Ahrendsen and McCollum where LAR was positively associated with the
propensity of a commercial bank to use loan guarantees.  
The elasticities for all continuous variables retained in the OL model are also listed in table
3.  These elasticities computed at the sample means vary from -1.66 for SIZE to 0.76 for
DEBTSVC.  Two of the four variables significant at the 0.05 level–DEBTSVC and AGTL–are16
inelastic.  The remaining two significant variables–SIZE and LAR–are elastic indicating OLNLC
is most sensitive to percentage changes in these variables.  Thus the continuing decrease in farm
numbers and corresponding increase in farm size imply that the structural change in farm
ownership implies lower loss rates.  Clearly there is a practical limit to the magnitude and impact
of LAR since LAR has an effective upper limit of 1.0.  Its sample mean is .61.  However,
continued bank mergers could lead to higher LARs and thereby lower loss claims ratios.
Implications of Insignificant Variables
In both the FO and OL models, the policy variables GOV, FOIRA and OLIRA were
insignificant.  The lack of relationship between government payments and the ratio of loss claims
to outstanding principal is surprising.  This result seems to agree with the Shepard and Collins
finding that government policy is typically reactive as opposed to proactive.  This would imply
that the government responds to farmer difficulties in bad years by prescribing remedies in later
years as opposed to dealing with current problems.  Also, government program benefits accrue to
larger producers and not just those producers on the economic margin who would typically be
guaranteed loan users.  Indeed, the heterogeneity in loss claims rates across states and lack of
association of GOV to both FONLC and OLNLC supports the conjecture that government
payments are not particularly effective in lowering loss claims rates.
There is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of no relationship between interest
rate assistance and loss claims rates.  This does not imply that IRA is necessarily failing to help
farmers stay in farming.  Undoubtedly those farmers receiving assistance are helped.  The fact that
IRA is uncorrelated with loss claims rates might indicate that the program is accomplishing its
goal of helping marginal farmers survive.  That is, given the assistance, such farmers fail at about17 Although the IRA program existed prior to 1992, these data were not available for the study.  Thus,
observations for this variable prior to 1992 are zeros. Models estimated with only 1992-1997 data are not
substantially different from those estimated with 1990-1997 data.
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the same rate as non-assisted farmers, ceteris paribus.  Also, the insignificance of FOIRA and
OLIRA might also be attributed to the levels of assistance being too modest to have an observable
impact
17.
The lack of significance of net farm income in the models is also surprising.  However, it is
very likely that the significant variable ROA in the FO model is explaining some of the variation
actually influenced by NFI.  The simple correlation coefficient between ROA and NFI is 0.7765. 
This argument cannot be made as strongly for the relationship between DEBTSVC and NFI for
the OL model in which the simple correlation coefficient is -0.3836.  Thus it seems that in the OL
model, DEBTSVC is a better indicator of financial stress than NFI since it directly focuses on
debt payments in relation to gross income.
CONCLUSIONS
Several financial characteristics of farm operators–including debt-to-asset ratios, rates of
return on assets and debt servicing ratios–are important in predicting loss claims rates.  Also,
structural characteristics of the farm economy such as percentage of total farm revenue derived
from the sale of crops, the proportion of farm operators working off the farm greater than 200
days per year and average farm size can be used to predict loss claims. 
The highly significant relationships between the commercial bank characteristics and the
loss claims to principal outstanding ratio imply factors external to agriculture impact loss claims. 
The banking industry has experienced a high level of mergers and acquisitions during the 1990s. 
As a result, banks necessarily have become more competitive to stay in business.  This study18
indicates this aggressiveness in lending practices has affected guaranteed loss claims in a positive
way.  Also, higher agricultural-to-total loan ratios decrease the loss claims ratio for both FO and
OL loans though not as strongly as increases in loan-to-asset ratios.  Since commercial banks with
considerable agricultural lending experience and low levels of loan losses can further streamline
guaranteed application procedures through a new Preferred Lender program, perhaps lender
participation in the program will increase.  Increased program usage by these FSA approved
lenders may lower loss claims rates. 
The results of the study indicate that interest rate assistance does not affect across state
variation in the ratio of loss claims to principal outstanding.  So while interest rate assistance
allows lenders to charge borrowers lower interest rates, this subsidy does not appear to alter
overall state-level loss claims rates.  This might indicate that the IRA program is successful in
putting all borrowers on a level playing field.  However, there is considerable variation in loss
claims ratios over regions, so some interest rate assistance reallocations might change this.  Of
course, interest rate assistance undoubtedly helps a number of farmers stay in business who
otherwise would likely fail–the main purpose of the assistance program.  Since long term interest
rates were found to have a significant impact on FO loss claims rates, interest rate assistance in
the future may be used as a policy tool to offset increases in long term interest rates in an effort to
limit loss claims rates.
Government payments were found to be insignificant in explaining the ratio of loss claims
to principal outstanding.  One justification of government payments is that they help the family
farmer stay in business.  FSA’s guaranteed loan program is targeted to family-sized farm
operators.  While FSA guaranteed borrowers represent only a small sample of the population of19
family-sized farm operators, the insignificance of government payments in the payment of loss
claims suggest that changes in government programs might be considered.20
Table 1.  Guaranteed Loss Claims Paid for the U.S.*, Fiscal Years 1989-1998
Fiscal Year FO Loans OL Loans Total Guaranteed
(Million $ - Nominal)
1989 9.6 29.6 39.2
1990 5.7 29.9 35.6
1991 7.0 33.6 40.6
1992 7.3 37.4 44.7
1993 8.7 41.1 49.8
1994 8.1 35.7 43.8
1995 5.9 26.4 32.3
1996 5.4 33.2 38.6
1997 6.3 51.5 57.8
1998 7.0 48.0 55.0
* U.S. totals do not include loss claims paid to Alaska, Hawaii or U.S. territories.
Source: Computed from FSA data--Steve Ford, FSA, Washington D.C.
Table 2.  Tobit Estimates for Farm Ownership Loan Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error  â/Standard Error Elasticity*
DAR 0.067  0.025  2.650  1.740 
ROA -0.632E-05  0.308E-05  -2.054  -0.330 
NFI 0.137  0.083  1.642  0.503 
CREV 0.008  0.004  2.199  0.615 
WORK -0.030  0.010  -3.055  -1.727 
SIZE -0.002  0.001  -1.455  -0.255 
LTINT 0.107  0.037  2.867  1.750 
AGTL -0.025  0.009  -2.891  -0.278 
LAR -0.036  0.009  -4.081  -3.590 
AGBNK -1.082  0.426  -2.539  -0.277 
* The elasticities for the continuous variables retained in the FO model were computed using the coefficients
adjusted for truncation in the TOBIT model (Greene), the sample means of the independent variables and the
expected value of the dependent variable evaluated at the sample means of the independent variables (Thraen,
Hammond and Buxton). R
2 for the OLS estimates of this model is 0.200. 
Table 3.  Estimated Coefficients for Operating Loan Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error â/Standard Error Elasticity*
DEBTSVC 0.061  0.021  2.980  0.762 
SIZE -0.020  0.005  -3.896  -1.657 
STINT -0.031  0.017  -1.848  -0.225 
AVGOL -0.041  0.023  -1.804  -0.293 
AGTL -0.052  0.024  -2.110  -0.283 
LAR -0.025  0.007  -3.671  -1.253 
* Elasticities are computed at sample means.  R
2 = 0.458.21
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